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Abstract 
In this paper, we propose a definition of goal achievability: given a basic action theory describing 
an initial state of the world and some primitive actions available to a robot, including some actions 
which return binary sensing information, what goals can be achieved by the robot? The main 
technical result of the paper is a proof that a simple robot programming language is universal, in 
that any effectively achievable goal can be achieved by getting the robot to execute one of the robot 
programs. The significance of this result is at least twofold. First, it is in many ways similar to 
the equivalence theorem between Turing machines and recursive functions, but applied to robots 
whose actions are specified by an action theory. Secondly, it provides formal justifications for using 
the simple robot programming language as a foundation for our work on robotics. 0 1998 Elsevier 
Science B.V. All rights reserved. 
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1. Introduction 
Imagine that in the not too distant future, you are given a robot of some sort, and that 
you want to figure out what it can do. Browsing through the manual that came with it, you 
discover that the robot is capable of performing under computer control any of a set of 
primitive actions al, . . , a,. According to the manual, what each action ai actually does 
depends on the state of the environment. First, to complete successfully, a precondition 
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of the action must hold in the environment. Next, assuming the action is successful, its 
effect on the environment may also depend on certain other conditions. Finally, some of 
the actions are connected to sensors and can return a binary value indicating when a certain 
condition holds. The question is: assuming we are willing to do some programming, what 
do we expect to be able to achieve with the robot? 
In this paper, we propose an answer to this question. Specifically, we propose an abstract 
characterization of what goals are effectively achievable as a function of a given logical 
theory describing the initial state of the world and the primitive actions available to the 
robot. The main contribution of the paper is a precise technical framework where questions 
of goal achievability can be posed and answered. The main technical result is a proof of 
the universality of the simple robot programming language introduced in [7]: it will turn 
out that a goal is effectively achievable according to logical theory T iff there is a robot 
program that achieves it according to T. 
1.1. A motivating example 
To make the problem more concrete, imagine that you are also given a solid steel box 
that contains a treasure. There is a small robot-sized door on the box, which is currently 
closed, and there are two buttons beside it, a green one and a red one. The primitive actions 
available to the robot are pressGreen, pressRed, and fetch. The manual says that if the robot 
happens to be beside the closed door, pressGreen causes the green button to be pressed, 
andpressRed similarly. The manual also says that the robot has a heat sensor so that a press 
action returns 1 when the button pressed was hot, and 0 otherwise. Thefetch action causes 
the robot to trundle inside the box and retrieve what’s inside, provided that the robot is 
beside the door and the door is open. 2 The goal we are interested in here, obviously, is 




If we know nothing else about the environment, we want our account of achievability 
to predict that we cannot achieve the goal. Of course, we might end up eventually 
getting the treasure by forcing the door open with a crowbar, or by saying some 
magic words, or even by getting the robot to press the buttons in some order. But 
there is no reason to believe a priori that any of these methods will work. 
If we know that the red button opens the door of the box, we want our account of 
achievability to say that we can achieve the goal using the robot: we get it to do 
the sequence pressRed, then fetch. Of course, something might go wrong: the door 
might jam, lightning might strike the robot, a comet might hit the earth. But there is 
no reason to believe that the sequence will fail given what we have been told. 
If we know that one of the buttons opens the door of the box, and the other button 
locks the door permanently, but we don’t know which is which, our account should 
predict that we cannot achieve the goal using the robot. As in (2), we know that 
there is a sequence of actions that will work-press one of the buttons thenfetch- 
but here we do not know what that sequence is. 
’ In a more realistic setting, of course, there would be a large number of other preconditions for actions like 
these. 
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(4) But consider the following situation: we know that the door can be opened by first 
pressing the green button, and then pressing one more button, but we are not told 
which, and again, getting it wrong locks the door permanently. However, suppose 
that we know that the safe will lock forever iff the robot pushes a button that felt 
hot on the previous press. As in (3), we know that there is a sequence of actions that 
will work, and again we cannot say what that sequence is. This time, however, our 
account should predict that we can achieve the goal: we get the robot to pressGreen, 
and then pressGreen once more if the button was cold, but pressRed if it was hot. 
(5) Finally, suppose we know that after pressing the green button some unspecified 
number of times and at least once, pressing the red button will open the door and 
pressing the green one will lock it forever. With no other information, we clearly 
cannot obtain the treasure. However, if we also know as in (4) that the door will 
lock forever iff the robot presses a button that was just hot, then we can once again 
achieve the goal: we get the robot to repeatedly press the green button until it feels 
hot, then press the red one to open the door, and then fetch the treasure. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is as yet no formal framework that would give the 
intuitively correct answers for examples like these. 
1.2. Relation to other work 
There are, however, three areas of research that come close to providing these answers. 
Planning. As the five examples above illustrate, the idea of a goal being achievable by 
a robot is clearly related to the concept of planning and especially, given the sensing, 
conditional planning, as in [2,13,19,23]. In all of the variants above, we ended up saying 
that the treasure was obtainable precisely when we could formulate some sort of plan to 
obtain it. Why then not simply define goal achievability in terms of the existence of a plan? 
The problem with this involves characterizing exactly what we mean by a plan. An 
obvious case is when a fixed sequence of actions is sufficient. But in some of the variants 
above, we needed to consider conditional and iterative plans, which suggests a structure 
more like that of a program [14]. Clearly these would not be programs in a traditional 
language like C or LISP. For one thing, the primitive statements of the program would have 
to involve the actions ai, rather than the usual variable assignment or read/write statements. 
What would we use as the conditions in an if-then-else or a while-loop statement? How 
should the execution of programs containing the ai be defined? 
We believe that these questions can be resolved and that it is possible to characterize 
achievability in terms of such programs (see Section 4 below) . However, to avoid making 
design decisions that might initially appear to be arbitrary or restrictive, we prefer to 
first define achievability in a general program-independent way, and then prove that a 
programming language is adequate according to this definition. 
Computability. A second concept related to achievability is that of effective computabil- 
ity [ 161. As will become clear, we will end up defining achievable goals as those where 
what to do next to achieve them, given what is known about the actions and the initial state 
of the world, can be “computed” as a function of what the sensors tell the robot. 
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However, we cannot simply use an existing account of computability for two reasons. 
First, we want to allow for incomplete information about the environment surrounding the 
robot. In contrast to typical accounts of computability, the initial state of the environment 
need only be partially specified by a collection of axioms. The second reason concerns the 
primitive actions. In typical computability models, the available actions are predefined and 
internal to the machine (or formalism). For instance, we might have actions to write and 
read a Turing machine tape, or to increment and decrement registers, or to assign values 
to variables, and so on. In our case, by contrast, the primitive actions for a robot are not 
predefined and are e_xternal, in that they have effects in the environment outside of the 
robot. These actions are also described by a collection of axioms, which specify the action 
preconditions and effects, and deal with the frame problem. 
Thus our account of goal achievability depends crucially on what the given axioms say 
about the initial state and the available actions. In some of the examples above, we had two 
theories Tt G T2 describing the same initial state and set of actions. A goal was considered 
unachievable relative to the information provided by Tl , but achievable relative to T2 where 
additional information was available. We would like to define a notion of goal achievability 
as a rdation between a formal theory T and the goals we would like to achieve, and no 
existing account of computability does this. 
Knowing how. Finally, the concept of achievability is very closely related to the concept 
of an agent knowing how (or being able to) achieve a goal or execute a plan, as discussed 
for example, in [ 1,24,25]. One difference between the two concepts concerns the issue of 
effectiveness. As far as we know, no existing account of knowing how or ability considers 
whether or not the know how of an agent would be effective, in the sense of allowing the 
agent to “compute” what to do. But putting effectiveness aside, there is also a difference 
in point of view: who has to know what and when. There may be conditions that we 
would consider to be achievable, but that the agent does not know how to bring about. 
For example, if the red button opens the door, we know that goal of getting the treasure is 
achievable by the agent/robot; but if the agent does not know which button is the correct 
one, we would not say that it knew how to get the treasure. Conversely, we can imagine a 
situation where we do not consider the goal to be achievable (in the sense of being able to 
produce a plan) because we do not know which buttons to use, but where we know that the 
agent does. We can also imagine situations where the agent initially knows less than we 
do, but after obtaining information from its sensors, knows as much or more than we do. 
When reasoning about what one agent knows about another, the concept of knowing- 
how or ability may be the more useful one; when attempting to analyze what we can get an 
agent or robot to do for us, our notion of goal achievability may be the more appropriate. 
Moreover, it ought to be the case that the two notions coincide when the agent knows 
exactly what we do about the environment and the actions. The precise relation between 
the two concepts is subtle, however, and we will not explore it further here (see [5]). 
In sum, while the concept of goal achievability is clearly related to the areas of planning, 
computability, and agent ability, none of these can give us the answers we want, for 
example, in the five situations above. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the situation 
calculus, a formal logical language in terms of which the state of the environment and the 
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primitive actions can be described by a collection of axioms we call a basic action theory. 
In Section 3, we define precisely what we mean by effective achievability (and related 
notions) as a function of a given basic action theory. In Section 4, we review the syntax 
and semantics of a simple robot programming language first proposed in [7] as a language 
for plans. In Section 5, we present some results, including the main technical result of the 
paper: the universality of the robot programming language. This is a robot analogue of 
the classic universality result in computability theory: a function is computable iff there 
is a program/machine that computes it. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize the paper and 
suggest topics for further research. 
2. The situation calculus and basic action theories 
Since the goal of this research is to make the specification of goal achievability depend 
on a given action theory T describing the initial state of the world and the available actions, 
we need to describe the representation language we use to formulate the theories, which is 
a dialect of the situation calculus [ 151. 
The language of the situation calculus is many-sorted. Normally, there is a sort for 
situations, a sort for actions, and a sort for objects like blocks and people that are elements 
in the domain of interest. We assume that there is a special constant SO used to denote the 
initial situation, namely that situation in which no actions have yet occurred; there is a 
distinguished binary function symbol do where do(a, s) denotes the successor situation to 
s resulting from performing the action a; relations whose truth values vary from situation 
to situation, are called (relational)$uents, and are denoted by predicate symbols taking a 
situation term as their last argument; there is a special predicate Poss(u, s) used to state that 
action a is executable in situation s; and finally, there is a special predicate SF(u, s) used 
to state that the sensor associated with action a (if any) returns the value 1 in situation s. 3 
Within this language, we can formulate domain theories which describe the initial state 
of the world and the actions available to the robot. We specify the preconditions of actions, 
for example, by writing axioms that define POD; we specify the condition measured by a 
sensor by writing axioms that define SF, and so on. Here, we use a theory which contains 
only the following axioms: 
l Axioms describing the initial situation, So. Syntactically, these axioms cannot 
mention any other situation terms except So. 
l Action precondition axioms, one for each primitive action A, characterizing Poss(A , s ) 
Syntactically, these axioms all have the following form: 
Poss(A, S) = PA(S), (1) 
where PA ((s) is a formula that does not mention any other situation terms except s, 
does not quantify over situation variables, and does not mention the special predicates 
like Pass, SF, or < (introduced below). 
3 In [7], the predicate SF was used to characterize what an agent knew in a situation in terms of a fluent K. In 
this paper, we will not be concerned with the knowledge of agents. 
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l Sensed fluent axioms, one for each primitive action A, characterizing SF(A, s). 
Syntactically, these axioms have the form: 
SF(A, S) = nA(S), 
where flA (s) satisfies the same conditions as those for PA(s) above. For actions that 
have nothing to do with sensors, this should be [SF(A, s) = True]. 
l Successor state axioms, one for each fluent F, characterizing under what conditions 
F(2, do(a, s)) holds as function of what holds in situation s. These take the place of 
the so-called effect axioms, but also provide a solution to the frame problem [20]. 
Syntactically, successor state axioms have the form: 
Poss(a, s) > [F (2, do(a) s)) = QF (2, a, s)], (2) 
where 0,~ satisfies the same conditions as those for $?A (s) above. 
l Unique names axioms for the primitive actions: For any two different actions A(,?) 
and A’(y), we have 
A(;) #A’($ 
and for any action A(xl , . . . , x,), we have 
AW,..., ~,)=A(yl,...,y,,)>xl=y~~...~/\n,=y,. 
l Foundational, domain-independent axioms that characterize the structure of the space 
of situations, and define a predicate < so that st < s2 holds iff s2 can be reached from 
st by a sequence of executable actions, i.e., there are actions at, . . . , a,, 0 < IZ, such 
that 
s2 = do(h 3.. . , anI, a) A 
Pcm(Ul, Sl) A.. . A Puss(u,,do([u~, . . .) a,-,], s,)) 
holds, where for any situation s, &([I, s) = s, and inductively, do([u]L], s) = do(L, 
&(a, s)). These axioms are: 
dO(Ul( Sl) = d&Q, s2) 3 (al = a2 A Sl = 4, 
(VP).P(So) A (Vu, s)[P(s> 3 P(do(u, s))] 3 (Vs)P(s), 
1s < so, 
s < do(u, s’) = (Poss(u, s’) AS < s’). 
Notice the similarity between these axioms and Peano Arithmetic. The first two 
axioms are unique names assumptions; they eliminate finite cycles, and merging. The 
third axiom is second-order induction; it amounts to a domain closure axiom which 
says that every situation must be obtained by repeatedly applying do to Se. 4 The last 
two axioms define < inductively. 
4 For a discussion of the use of induction in the situation calculus, see (Reiter [21]). 
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Following [ 111, we call a theory of this form a basic action theory. In this paper we shall 
consider the question of effective achievability with respect to a basic action theory. Before 
turning to this task, we first make some remarks about the generality of our basic action 
theories and their relationships with more popularly used formalisms such as STRIPS [3] 
and ADL [ 171 used in AI planning. 
If we do not consider sensing actions, then as far as the action effects are concerned, 
basic action theories have more or less the same expressive power as Pednault’s ADL 
action description language, which is more expressive than STRIPS and used by UCPOP 
[ 181. The main reason is that if there are no sensing actions, as far as the effects of actions 
are concerned, a basic action theory consists of a set of action precondition and successor 
state axioms of the forms (1) and (2), respectively. Under some reasonable conditions, 
these axioms can be reformulated as Pednault’s ADL descriptions and vise versa following 
a procedure discussed in detail by Reiter [20] and Pednault [17]. In any event, for our 
purposes here, an action theory that does not have any sensing actions is not that interesting: 
if (Va).SF(a, s) = True, then a goal G(s) is achievable in a situation S iff there is an 
executable sequence r of ground actions such that G(do(r, S)) is entailed by the action 
theory. In this case, induction provides a powerful technique for proving what can and 
cannot be achieved, as shown by Reiter [21]. 
To the best of our knowledge, UWL [2] is the only STRIPS-like action description 
language that axiomatizes the effects of a sensing action on the agent’s knowledge state. On 
the one hand, our action theories are more general than UWL domain descriptions in that 
we allow arbitrary formula to be sensed while UWL only allows a conjunction of literals. 
On the other hand, UWL is more general in that it allows a precondition of an operator to 
be a knowledge goal such as ( find-out ( P . v) ) (find out the truth value of P) or a 
maintenance goal such as (hands-of f P ) (do not change the truth value of P). These 
goals, although can be handled in the situation calculus, 5 are beyond the scope of this 
paper, and are interesting future research topics. Ignoring these differences, our account 
of effective achievability can then be used, for example, to check whether the planning 
algorithm for UWL given in [2] is sound and/or complete. 
For further details on the generality of our approach, see also [7], where a number 
of examples are given of goals that are intuitively achievable/unachievable in the 
presence/absence of sensing. This paper contains examples of goals that can only be 
achieved by plans containing loops as well as sensing, and as far as we know, it is the only 
account that has this generality. It was this paper that inspired us to look for a definition of 
goal achievability that did not appeal to a predefined programming language of plans. 
3. Effective achievability 
To define in its most general form what a robot armed with primitive actions al, . . a,. 
can achieve, it is useful to begin by looking at the problem from the point of view of a 
robot controller, for instance, an onboard computer. 
5 See [5,22] for a treatment of knowledge goals, and [S-lo] for some example formalization of temporal 
constraints in the situation calculus. 
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What a robot controller needs to do at any given point in time is to select the primitive 
action to perform next (or to stop). We are willing to assume arbitrary amounts of 
computation and intelligence in making this decision, as well as full access to the given 
basic action theory. We do not want to assume, however, that the controller necessarily 
knows everything there is to know about the current state of the environment. For example, 
if it is part of the basic action theory that a door is open initially, the controller can use this 
fact; but if the action theory does not specify the state of the door, the robot may need to 
perform some (sensing) action to find out whether it is open, assuming such an action is 
available. 
So what does a robot controller have access to beyond the given basic action theory? 
In its most general form, we might imagine that the robot controller remembers all of 
the actions it has selected until now, as well as the sensing results of all these actions. In 
general, these sensing results must be compatible with the given action theory, but will not 
be entailed by it, and so provide additional information to the controller. 
Once we have specified what a robot controller is, we can then define the achievable 
goals. Roughly, a goal will be considered to be achievable if there exists a robot controller 
such that if we were to repeatedly do the primitive action it prescribes, then no matter how 
the sensing turns out, we would eventually terminate in a situation where, according to 
the action theory, the goal condition would hold. We now proceed to formally define the 
relevant notions. 
3.1. Robot controllers and environments 
We assume a finite set A of actions that are parameterless, and represented by constant 
symbols. At any point, the robot will be in some state determined by the actions it has 
performed so far and, in the event of sensing, the readings of its sensors. More precisely, 
we define: 
Definition 1 (History). A history CT is an element of the set R = (A x (0, l})*. 
Intuitively, the history (~1, B1) o . . . o (an, ,&) means that ~1, . . . , a, is the sequence of 
actions performed so far, and B1, . . , /In are the respective sensing results of the actions: 
For any i, if the sensing fluent SF holds for oi in the situation where the action is 
performed, then pi = 1, else pi = 0. Notice that by the form of basic action theories (cf. 
Section 2) if czi is an action that has nothing to do with sensors, then j?i = 1. Notice also 
that the empty sequence E is a history. 
A robot controller is then a mapping from such a history to the next action to perform. 
In addition to the given primitive actions in A, we assume some special symbols. In the 
following, let ,4+ = A U {stop, abort, I], where stop, abort, and I are special symbols 
not in A. Intuitively, stop will be used to denote termination, abort to signal exit before the 
end of the computation, and I to denote an undefined computation. 6 Formally, we define: 
6 The reason we need abort and I will be made clear later in the context of robot programs. 
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Definition 2 (Robot controller). A (robot) controller C is any function from histories to 
actions or special symbols, C : R =+ A+. 
Definition 3 (Effective controller). A controller is effective if the function C is recursive. 
It should be clear that the only feedback the robot gets from the environment is through 
its sensors. Just as a robot controller specifies the next action to perform, an environment 
specifies the sensing result of that action. More precisely, we define: 
Definition 4 (Environment). An environment E is any function from histories and actions 
totheset(O,l], E:Rxd*{O,l}. 
In other words, &(a, cz) tells us what the sensor associated with action (Y will report given 
the history D. 
Intuitively, the picture is this. We start with the empty history E; the robot controller 
C chooses an action to perform (111 = C(E); the environment I determines the value 
returned by the ~1 sensor: fit = &(F, at); given this result, the robot then chooses another 
action to perform a2 = C((at , PI)), and the environment determines the ~2 sensor value: 
82 = E((crt , Bl), CQ,); then ~3 = C((crt , /3t) o ((2’2,82)) and so on, until C says stop. 
Definition 5 (System). A system is a pair (C, E), where C is a controller, and I an 
environment. 
Frequently, we shall refer to the system (C, E) as the controller C under the environ- 
ment E. 
Definition 6 ((Terminating) run). A history 0 is a run of a system (C, E) if, inductively, 
either 0 is the empty sequence E or cr = cr’ o (a, /l) such that ~9 is a run of the system, 
C(a’) = a! E A, and E(a’, a) = ,I!?. A history 0 is a terminating run of (C, E) if it is a run 
of (C, I) and C(a) = stop. 
Clearly, a system can have at most one terminating run. 
3.2. Achievability and effective achievability 
Note that neither controllers nor environments are part of the situation calculus; they 
are simply abstract functions over the domain of histories. To make a connection with the 
situation calculus, we first relate histories to situations: 
Definition 7 (Run and situation). Given any history 0, and any situation term s, we define 
another situation term, the end situation of 0 on s, written end(a, s), as: end(s, s) = s; and 
inductively, if (T = o’ o (a, ,!?), then end(a, s) = do(a, end(cr’, s)). 
Next, we relate environments to logical interpretations of a basic action theory. 
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Definition 8 (Environment and interpretation). Given an interpretation I and a ground 
situation term S, an environment & is said to be determined by I at S iff for any history c, 
and any action cz, E(cr, a) = 1 iff I b SF(a, end(a, S)). 
It is clear that there is exactly one such environment for any given Z and S. In other 
words, once we specify an interpretation of a basic action theory (and a starting situation), 
the interpretation of the SF predicate completely determines how the sensing will turn out, 
and hence the environment. 
In general, we expect a basic action theory to be satisfied by many interpretations, 
corresponding to the various ways the environment could turn out. Goal achievability 
requires a controller to work in all such interpretations: 
Definition 9 ((Effective) achievability). Given an action theory T, a goal G(s) which is 
a formula with a single free situation variable s, and a ground situation term S, we say 
that G is (effectively) achievable in S according to T iff there is an (effective) controller C 
such that for any model I of T, there is a terminating run o of C under the environment 
determined by I at S such that I b S < end(a, S) A G(end(a, S)). 
Notice that the condition S < end(o, S) means that end(a, S) is reachable from S by a 
sequence of executable actions. This means that the actions prescribed by the run ~7 must 
be executable in their respective situations. This condition reflects our intuition that for a 
goal to be achievable, the sequence of actions that is used to achieve it must be at least 
executable. ’
In general, there will be goals that are achievable but not effectively achievable. 
However, as we are going to show below, for context-free action theories, if a goal is 
achievable, then it is also effectively achievable. 
3.3. Achievability in context-free action theories 
By a context-free action theory we mean a theory in which all actions are context-free 
in the sense that their effects are independent of the state in which they are executed. For 
example, in the blocks world, the action stack(x, y), that picks up block x on the table and 
puts in on top of block y, is context-free-as long as it is executable, it will always cause 
x to be on y. On the other hand, in the extended blocks world in which there may be more 
than one block on top of another block, the action unstuck(x, y), that removes x from y, 
is not context-free-whether block y will be clear afterwards, for example, depends on 
whether x was the only block on top of y . 
’ An interesting question motivated by a comment from an anonymous referee is whether basic action theories 
are strong enough to make this condition redundant in Definition 9. A simpler question asks whether for any 
goal G, whenever there is a situation S such that T t= G(S), then there is another situation S’ such that 
T + So < 5” A G(S’). These are presently open questions. However, except possibly making our definition of 
achievability a little simpler, the answers to them have otherwise no effect on the results of this paper. 
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Now an action theory is context-free if, according to the theory, all actions are context- 
free. Formally, following [ 121, we call an action theory T context-free if every successor 
state axiom in it has the following form: 
Poss(a, s) > [F@, &(a, X,) = yF+.($ u) v (F($ s) A -y&u))], (3) 
where vg (2, a) and y; (2, a) are situation-independent formulas whose free variables are 
among those in x’, a. Under the following consistency condition [20]: 
c I== (k+(&m w&s)), (4) 
the axiom (3) implies that for any action a, after the action is performed, F will be 
true (added) for tuples in {T / y,‘(,?, a)}, false (deleted) for tuples in (x’ / y;(x’, a)}, and 
persist for tuples in (2 ( -y,i$(;, a) A -yF(;, a)}. The action a is context-free because 
the conditions YF and v,$ are situation-independent. Note that in the usual formulation of 
STRIPS, with add and delete lists, every action is considered to be context-free. 
Theorem 1. Let T be a context-free action theory, and the consistency condition (4) holds 
for everyjuent F. ’ If a goal G is achievable in S, then it is also effectively achievable. 
Proof. See Appendix A. q 
Informally, the theorem holds because a context-free action theory can only have finite 
number of possible legal states. One can read the theorem in two ways. On the one hand, 
it points to some potential computational advantages of working with context-free action 
theories. On the other hand, it also points out their expressive limitations. For example, this 
theorem implies that it is impossible to simulate an arbitrary context-sensitive action with 
ajkite set of context-free actions. 
4. A robot program language 
In [7], the following question was considered: what should the output of a planning 
procedure be? In the absence of sensing, the answer is reasonably clear and dates back 
to Green [4]: a plan is a legally executable sequence of actions that results in a final 
situation where the goal condition holds, In the presence of sensing, however, a planner 
cannot simply return a sequence of actions since the actions to execute to satisfy the goal 
could depend on the runtime result of earlier sensing operations (as in the examples in the 
introduction). 
Clearly, what is needed is something more like a program, with branches and loops. On 
the other hand, it would need to be a program that is not only legally executable (in the 
sense that the preconditions of the primitive actions at each step are satisfied), and leads to 
a goal state (in the sense that the program terminates and the goal condition holds in the 
terminating situation), but also a program that does not require more information to execute 
’ Technically, this condition is not necessary. However, it simplifies our proof, and is a reasonable condition to 
impose on action theories. 
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than what we expect the robot to have. For example, if all we know is that the door to the 
steel box opens by pushing either the red or the green button, then the program which says 
something like “if the red button is the one that opens the door then push it, else push the 
other one” might satisfy the first two conditions, but not the last one. 
There are various ways to ensure this last requirement. The approach taken in [7] is 
to invent a simple language that contains branches and loops, but that does not mention 
any conditions involving fluents. The resulting programs are then trivial to execute since 
without such conditions, there is nothing for the robot executing the programs to know. 
Consider the following simple programming language, defined as the least set of terms 
satisfying the following: 
(1) nil and exit are programs. 
(2) Ifa is a&action and rl and r2 are programs, then brunch(a, ~1, r-2) is a program. 
(3) If ~1 and r2 are programs, then loop(rl , ~2) is a program. 
We will call such terms robot programs and the resulting set of terms R, the robot 
programming language. 
Informally, these programs are executed by an agent as follows: to execute nil the agent 
does nothing; to execute exit it must be executing a loop, in which case see below; to 
execute brunch(a, r1 , ~2) it first executes primitive action a, and then it executes rl if the 
sensor associated with a returns 1, and r2 otherwise; to execute loop(q) Q), it executes the 
body r] , and if it ends with r&l, it repeats PI again, and continues doing so until it ends with 
e&, in which case it finishes by executing r2. 
Note that many actions will not have an associated sensor and will always return 1. We 
thus use the abbreviation ~(a, r) for brunch(u, r, r) for those cases where the returned 
value is ignored. 
Here are some robot programs for the examples in the introduction. (Recall that the 
pressGreen action returns 1 if the button is hot.) 
(1) Sequence of actions: 
x@ressRed, -(fetch, nil)). - 
(2) Conditional plan: 
brunch(pressGreen, 
w@ressRed, &$etch, nil)), - 
x@ressGreen, x(fetch, nil))). - 
(3) Iterative plan: 
loop(brunchCpressGreen, exit, nil), 
s(pressRed, =(fetch, r&Z))). 
Intuitively at least, the following should be clear: 
l An agent can always be assumed to know how to execute a robot program. These 
programs are completely deterministic, and do not mention any fluents. Assuming the 
binary sensing actions return a single bit of information to the agent, there is nothing 
else it should need to know. 
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. The example robot programs above, when executed, result in final situations where 
the goal conditions from the introduction are satisfied. 
To be precise about this, we need to first define what situation is the final one resulting 
from executing a robot program r in an initial situation s. Because a robot program could 
conceivably loop forever (e.g., loop(nil, nil)), we will use a formula Rdo(r, s, s’) to mean 
that Y terminates legally when started in s, and s’ is the final situation. Formally, Rdo is an 
abbreviation for the following second-order formula: 
Rdo(r,sl,sz) EfVP[ ... > P(r,sr,sz, l)] 
where the ellipsis is (the conjunction of the universal closure of) the following: 
(1) Termination, normal case: P(nJ, s, s, 1). 
(2) Termination, loop body: P(&, s, s, 0). 
(3) Primitive actions returning 1: 
(5) 
Poss(a, s) A SF(a, s) A P(r’, do(a, s), s’, x) > 
P(brunch(u, r’, r”), s, s’, x). 
(4) Primitive actions returning 0: 
Poss(u, s) A -SF(u, s) A P(r”, do@, s), s’, x) > 
P(brunch(u, r’, r”), s, s’, x). 
(5) Loops, exit case: 
P(r’, s, s”, 0) A P(r”, s”, s’, x) > P(loop(r’, r”), s, s’, x). 
(6) Loops, repeat case: 
P(r’, s, s”, 1) A P(loop(r’, r”), s”, s’, x) > P(loop(r’, r”), s, s’, x). 
By using second-order quantification in this way, we are defining Rdo recursively as the 
least predicate P satisfying the constraints in the ellipsis. Second-order logic is necessary 
here since there is no way to characterize the transitive closure implicit in unbounded 
iteration in first-order terms. 
The relation P(r, s, s’, 0) in this definition is intended to hold when executing r starting 
in s terminates legally at s’ with e&; P(r, s, s’, 1) is the same but terminating with nil. The 
difference shows up when executing loop(r, r’): in the former case, we exit the loop and 
continue with r’; in the latter, we continue the iteration by repeating &jr, r’) once more. 
With this definition in place, we can now characterize precisely the goals that are 
achievable using robot programs: 
Given an action theory T, a robot program r, a goal condition G(s) and a ground 
situation term S, we say that r achieves G in S according to T iff 
T /= 3s’.Rdo(r, S, s’) A G(s’). 
We now relate this definition to effective achievability. 
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5. Robot programs are universal 
Our main technical result in this paper is that a goal is achievable by an (augmented) 
robot program iff it is achievable by an effective controller. We shall prove this in two parts. 
First, we show that for any robot program, there is a corresponding effective controller for 
it. We then show that if 5 special “Turing machine actions” are included, then any effective 
controller can be simulated by a robot program. 
5. I. From robot programs to effective controllers 
Theorem 2. For any robotprogram r and any ground situation term S, there is an effective 
controller C such thatfor any interpretation I and any ground situation term S’: 
(1) If I /= Rdo(r, S, S’), then there is a terminating run o of the system (C, E) such that 
S’ = endfo, S), where E is the environment determined by I at S. 
(2) Ifthere is a terminating run o of the system (C, E) such that end(a, S) = S’, then 
I + S < S’ > Rdo(r, S, S’). Here & is the environment determined by I at S. 
Proof. See Appendix B. 0 
5.2. From effective controllers to robot programs 
Given an effective controller, there may not always be a robot program that simulates 
it. 9 The easiest way to remedy this is to add some special Turing machine actions as 
in [7]. 
Formally, we assume that in addition to the actions in A, we have five special actions, 
left, right, mark, erase, read-mark, and two special fluents Marked, lot, characterized by 
the following axioms: 
(1) Precondition: the five actions are always possible 
Poss(left, s) A Poss(right, s) A Poss(mark, s) A 
Poss(erase, s) A Poss(read_mark, s). 
(2) Successor state: only erase and mark change the Marked fluent 
Poss(a, s) 1 {Marked(n, do(a, s)) = 
a = mark A lot(s) = n v 
Marked(n, s) A -[a = erase A lot(s) = n]). 
(3) Successor state: only left and right change the lot fluent 
9 The proof of this is somewhat laborious. Observe that despite the presence of loops, a robot program has no 
internal memory and so no way of counting. So consider an action theory that encodes a string problem: decide 
if a string of OS and 1s has more OS than Is. A Turing machine can do this, but a finite-state automaton cannot. 
Similarly, an effective controller can achieve the corresponding goal, but a robot program in general cannot. We 
omit the details. 
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Poss(a, s) > (loc(do(a, s)) = n = 
a = lefr A lot(s) = n + 1 v 
a = righr A lot(s) = n - 1 v 
lot(s) = n A a # left A a # right}. 
(4) Sensed fluent: read_mark tells the agent whether the current location is marked 
SF(lej?. s) A SF(right, s) A SF(erase, s) A SF(mark, s) A 
[SF(read_mark, s) E Murked(loc(s), s)]. 
These axioms ensure that the five special actions provide the robot with what amounts to a 
Turing machine tape. 
In the following, we will be using what we will call a TM basic action theory. This is 
a basic action theory as before, but where A includes the five special actions, T contains 
the above axioms, and where the successor state axioms in T for fluents other than lot and 
Marked are such they are unaffected by the five actions. More precisely, for any fluent F 
that is different from Marked and lot, and when A is any of the five special actions, the 
theory T entails: 
Poss(A,s) > [F(do(A,s)) = F(s)]. 
In the following, for any ground situation term S, we define clean(S) to be the situation 
term obtained from S by deleting all the special five actions: clean($) = SO, and 
clean(do(cr, S)) = do(a, clean(S)) 
if Q! E A is not a Turing action, and clean(do(a, S)) = clean(S) otherwise. 
Theorem 3. For any TM basic action theory T, any effective controller C, and any ground 
situation term S, there is a robot program r such that for any model I of T (as above) and 
any ground situation S’, we have: 
(1) Ij’I + Rdo(r, S, S’), then there is a terminating run D of the system (C, E) such that 
clean(S’) = end(a, S), where & is the environment determined by I at S. 
(2) If there is a terminating run o of the system (C, E) such that S’ = end(a, S), 
then there is a situation Srf such that S’ = clean(S”), and 1 b S < end(o, S) > 
Rdo(r. S, S”), where & is the environment determined by I at S. 
Proof. See Appendix C. III 
5.3. The main theorem 
By Theorems 2 and 3, we have the following result: 
Theorem 4. Let T be any TM basic action theory and G be any goal that does not mention 
the specialfluents lot and Marked. Then G is effectively achievable in S according to T 
tjfthere is a robot program r such that r achieves G in S according to T. 
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Proof. Suppose G is achieved by the effective controller C. We show that the robot 
program r for C as in Theorem 3 achieves G. Suppose Z is any model of T. Then, by 
the definition of achievability, there is a terminating run o of (C, E) such that 
I + S 6 end(o, S) A G(end(a, S)), 
where & is the environment determined by I and S. According to Theorem 3, there is a 
situation S” such that cZean(S”) = end(a, S) and 
I k S 6 end(cr, S) > Rdo(r, S, 9’). 
Thus I b Z?do(r, S, S”). By Z b G(end(a, S)) and cZean(S”) = end(a, S), we have 
Z b G(S”) (by a property about clean). So Z + (L’)Rdo(r, S, s’) A G(s’). Therefore 
T + @s’)Rdo(r, S, s’) A G(d), and so r achieves G. 
Conversely, suppose r achieves G in S. We show that the effective controller C for 
r as in Theorem 2 achieves G in S, i.e., for any model Z of T, there is a terminating 
run 0 of the system (C, E) such that Z /= S < end(a, S) A G(end(a, S)), where & is the 
environment determined by Z and S. Now suppose Z is a model of T, by the assumption 
that r achieves G, i.e., T + (3s’)Rdo(r, S, s’) A G(d), there is a ground situation term S’ 
such that Z + Rdo(r, S, S’) A G(S’). By Theorem 2, there is a terminating run o of (C, E) 
such that S’ = end(o, S). So 
Z + Rdo(r, S, end(a, S)) A G(end(a, S)). 
But by the definition of Rdo, we have + (b’s], sz)Rdo(r, ~1,s~) 3 sl < ~2. Thus we have 
Z + 5’ < end(a, S). This shows that G is achieved by the controller C. q 
6. Conclusion 
We have provided a definition of what it might mean for a condition to be achievable by 
a robot relative to a given action theory which describes the initial state of the world and the 
primitive actions available to the robot. Our main technical contribution is in showing that 
this notion of effective achievability coincides with a notion of achievability by a simple 
class of robot programs independently introduced in [7]. The significance of this result 
is at least twofold. First, it is in many ways similar to the equivalence theorem between 
Turing machines and recursive functions, but applied to robots whose actions are specified 
by an action theory. Secondly, it provides formal justifications for using the simple class of 
robot programs as a foundation for our work on robotics. For instance, [7] uses this class 
of robot programs as a basis for robot planning. We are also beginning work on compiling 
high-level GOLOG programs [6] into this class of robot programs. 
There are some limitations with our current model that are worth mentioning here. First 
of all, we have assumed that there are only a finite number of parameterless actions. We 
have also assumed that the sensing actions are binary, characterized by the special SF 
predicate. Furthermore, we have assumed that the only feedback from the environment is 
the result of these sensing actions. In particular, we have not concerned ourselves here with 
possible action failure or exogenous actions. Some of these assumptions, such as the binary 
nature of sensing, are easy to relax; others will require more effort. 
F: Lin, H. J. Levesque /Artijicial Intelligence 101 (1998) 201-226 217 
In concluding, we want to mention that we are working on relating this work to our 
other work on agent ability and knowing-how [5]. Another direction worth pursuing 
is investigating the “finite automaton” version of achievability, i.e., the power of robot 
programs without the special Turing machine actions. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 1 
Theorem 1. Let T be a context-free action theory, and the consistency condition (4) holds 
for every fluent F. If a goal G is achievable in S, then it is also effectively achievable. 
We first prove a lemma which says that the set of legal states in a context-free 
action theory is finite. To formulate the lemma, we first introduce a few notations. Let 
FI (X; , s), . . . , F, (X;, , s) be all the fluents in the language. We define SameStute(s, s’), 
meaning that s and s’ yield the same state, as follows: 
SameStute(s, s’) dzf 
(V;,)(F,(&,s) 3 Fl(;,,s’)) A...A (V&)(F,(&,s) = F,(&s’)). 
The following are some simple properties about SameState: 
Lemma A.l. For any basic action theory T, we have: 
T + (Va, s, s’).SumeState(s, s’) 3 [Poss(a, s) = Poss(a, s’)], 
T t= (Vu, s, s’).SameStare(s, s’) II [SF@, s) = SF(u, s’)], 
T /= (Vu, s, s’).Poss(a, s) A SameStute(s, s’) > SameStute(do(a, .s), do(a, s’)). 
Proof. Trivially from the definition of basic action theories. [? 
Lemma A.2. Let T be a context-free action theory with finite number of parameterless 
actions. Under the consistency condition (4), there is a natural number N such that the 
following set 
( ]]do(<, SO) I] 1 6 is a list of actions} 
contains less than N elements, where for any list of actions 6, 
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Ild4C, So)lI = {do&‘, so) I T k so 6 do(C, So) A So < do@‘, So) 3 
SumeStute(do(~, So), do(c’, SO))}. 
In other words, the number of possibly diflerent legal states is bounded by N. 
Proof. To simplify our proof, without loss of generality, we assume that the action theory 
has only two actions A and B. Consider an arbitrary fluent F(x’, s). Suppose its successor 
state axiom is as (3). By the consistency condition (4), we have 
T I= F(?, do([l, So)) = F(k So), 
I 
True ifv$(g, A), 
T + SO ,< do([Al, SO) > F(;, do([Al, SO)) = False if YF (2, A), 
F(k So) otherwise, 
True if yF+(i, B), 
T I= So < doUB1, So) 3 F(2, do([Bl, So)) = False if v,(;, B), 
T I= So 6 d&A, 4, So) 3 
F(?, do([A, Bl, So)) = 
T i= So < do([B, Al, So) 3 
F(% do(EB, Al, So)) = 
Furthermore 
[ F(;, So) otherwise, 
True if yc(?, A) A yyF(;, B), 
True if yFf(2, B), 
False if yF(.?, A) ~-y$(.?, B), 
False if v,(;, B), 
F(k So) otherwise, 
True if yT(2, B) A-)/;(;, A), 
True if y:(;, A), 
False if yF(2, B) ~-yg(?, A), 
False if y,(i, A), 
F(% So) otherwise. 
T I= So 6 doHA, Al, So) 3 F(k doGA, Al, So)) = F(% doCAl, So)), 
T t= So 6 do([B, Bl, So) 3 F(% do([B, Bl, So)) = F(t do([Bl, So)), 
T t= So < do([A, B, Al, So) A So 6 do([B, Al, So) 3 
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F(i, do@, B, Al, So)) = F(% do@% Al, So)), 
7’ k So < doGA, B, Bl, So) 3 F(k do([A, B, Bl, So)) = F(k do(M 4, So)), 
T I= So < do([B, A, Al, So) 3 F(%o([B, A, Al, So)) = F(% dofIB, Al, So)), 
T k So 6 do([B, A, 4, So) A So < do([A, 4, So) 3 
F(-t do([B, A, Bl, So)) = F(t doGA, 4, So)). 
Since the fluent F is arbitrary, the finiteness of the set in question follows. 0 
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose G is achievable in S according to T. We need to show that 
there is a recursive controller that achieves G in S according to T. In fact, we can do better. 
We’ll show that there is ajnite controller that achieves G. Let C be a robot controller that 
achieves G according to T, and let 
S = (a 1 C-J is a terminating run of C under the environment 
determined by a model of T at S}. 
Then the following controller 
C’(Q) = 
I 
I if 0 is not a prefix of any history in S, 
stop if c E S, (A.1) 
a if for some B, CJ o (a, j?) is a prefix of a history in S, 
is clearly well (uniquely) defined, and achieves G in S as well. Furthermore, if S is finite, 
then C’ is finite, thus recursive. We now show that S is indeed finite. 
Observe, however, that even though there are only finitely many states, we cannot bound 
the length of a run by removing “loops” starting and ending in the same state (and guarantee 
the finiteness of S this way). This is because a controller may be using pure sensing actions 
which do not change the state to obtain information. So we need a slightly more complex 
approach. 
Given a set of histories 3-1, and a history CJ E E, a segment t in c: 0 = 01 o t o 02 for 
some ~1 and 02, is said to be determinate if for any 0’ in ‘H, whenever (~1 is a proper prefix 
of D’, then DI o r is a prefix of 0’. In other words, the underlying controller determined by 
7-1 according to (A. 1) with S replaced by ‘Ft, if any, does not need to consider the alternative 
outcome of the actions in r. Notice that the empty sequence is trivially a determinate 
segment of any history 0 with respect to any ~1 and 02 above. 
Given any run 0 E S, we can decompose it into 
0 =ol O(~l~~l>~‘~‘~~k~(~k,~k)~~k+l (A.21 
such that 
(1) OI>..., ~+t are determinate segments of 0 in S. 
(2) 01 o(o1,/4)3..., crk 0 (CQ, j3k) are not determinate segments of c in S. 
Clearly, this decomposition is unique. Furthermore, it has the following properties: 
(I) For any cr’ E S, if 
cr’ = a; 0 ((2; ) p;> 0 . . .o a; 0 (c&) &J 0 o,;+, 
220 E Lin, H.J. Levesque /Arti&ial Intelligence 101 (1998) 201-226 
is a similar decomposition of r~‘, and 
(al,Bl)0...O(ak,Bk)=(a;,B;)O..~O(~:,,BI)~ 
then c = 0’. Suppose the above equation holds, then m = k, ai = ai, and ,8i = ,6/, 
I < i 6 k. We show by induction on 0 < i < k that 
01 O(~l~Bl>O~ ~~O~~O(~~,~~)~~~O(~/l~~~)O~~~O~~O(~j~~~)~ 
The base case is trivial because both of them are empty sequence. Suppose 
~]O(~],~])O~~~O~~O((;Y~,~~)~~~~(~~~~~)O~~~o~~o(~~~~~)~ 
we show that 
cl 0 (al 3 Bl I 0 . O ai+l O C&i+1 2 Bi+l I 
=a; 0 (a;>/$) o-~;+, 0 (olj+],B;+])> 
that is, ai+] = pi’,, . Because aj+] is a determinate segment, by definition, we have 
that CJ] o (o], B]) o ... o ai+] must be a prefix of (5’. Similarly, 0; o (a;, /3;) o 
. 
O 4+, is a prefix of c. So either ai+] = a;+] or one of them is a proper 
prefix of the other. The latter is impossible because otherwise, say ci+] is a proper 
prefix of cri’,] , then o:+, cannot be a determinate segment of o, which violates our 
assumptions. This proves that 
01 0 (aI 3 PI) 0 . . . o,o~,,,~~)=a;o(a;,~;)O...Oa~o(a;,~~). 
Finally, o = cr’. For otherwise, one of them would be a proper prefix of the other, 
which is impossible because they are both runs of C under some environment. 
(II) For any 1 < i < j < k, if OQ = oj, then 
TpS<end(t,j-] Ooj,S)> 
SU??Zf?StUte(e?Zd(~i_] OCJi,S),etd(~j-1 OCTj,S)), 
where for any 0 6 m < k, cfn is the history: 
For otherwise, suppose 
SameStute(end(&~ 0 Di, S),UUi(~j-1 0 C7j, S)). (A.3) 
We claim that aj o (oj, pj) would have to be a determinate segment of c, a 
contradiction with the assumptions that we made about Eq. (A.2). To show that 
aj o (oj , /3j) is a determinate segment of o , suppose cr’ E S, and cj - 1 is a proper 
prefix of cr’. Then <j_] o aj must be a prefix of a’ for oj is a determinate segment 
of o. Because both c# and o are terminating runs of the controller C, for some 
/?, cj_] o oj o (oj, B) must be a prefix of &. NOW let I be the model of T under 
which (T’ is the terminating run of the controller C. Since c’ E S, by Definition 9, 
1 + S < end(a’, S). Thus by (A.3), 
I + SameStUte(end(&] 0 Oi, S). ULd(<j-1 0 Gj, S)) 
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Since oi = aj, by Lemma A. 1 B = pi. Similarly, /lj = pi. SO /3 = pj. Thus <j is a 
prefix of (T’. This shows that Oj o (aj, @j) is a determinate segment of 0. 
Thus by Lemma A.2 and the above property (II), for any run o in S, if it is decomposed 
as (A.2), then k < M x N, where M is the number of actions, and N is the upper bound 
of the number of possible equivalent classes given in Lemma A.2. By property (I), this 
implies that S must be finite. 
Appendix B. Proof of Theorem 2 
We shall prove a more general result than Theorem 2. To that end, we introduce a relation 
Rexit(r, s, s’) meaning that when started in s, the program r will exit (abort) in s’. It is 
defined in the way similar to Rdo in Section 4, as an abbreviation of the following second- 
order formula: 
Rexit(r, s, s’) %f (VP)[ . > P(s, s’, O)]. 
where the ellipsis is exactly the same as in (5), i.e., the conjunction of six conditions given 
in Section 4. From this definition, it is easy to verify that the following are consequences 
of any basic action theory: 
-Rexit@, s, s’), 
Rexit(&, s, s), 
Rexit(brunch(a, rl, Q), s, s’) 
3 Poss(a, s) A [SF(a, s) > Rexit(q, do(u, s), s’)] A 
[-SF(u, s) II Rexit(r2, do(u, s), s’)]. 
The purpose of introducing Rexit is for the following lemma: 
Lemma B.l. Let T be an action theory, and I a model of T. For any ground situation 
terms S and S’, I f== Rdo(&(rl, q), S, S’) iff there are some ground situation terms 
Sly..., S,, II 3 3, such that 
(1) S=St undS’=S,. 
(2) For any 1 < i < n - 3, Z + Rdo(rl, Sit &‘+I). 
(3) I k Rexit(rl, Sn-2, Sn-l), and I t= Rdo(r2, Sn-l, S,). 
Similarly, I b Rexit(loop(q, rz), S, S’) ifs there are some Sl, . . , S,, n 3 3, such that 
(1) S=St undS’=S,. 
(2) For any 1 < i < n - 3, I /== Rdo(q, Si, $+I). 
(3) I t= Rexit(rl, Sn-2, Sn_l), and I + Rexit(r2, $_I, S,). 
Proof. By induction on the structure of rl . q 
In the following, a history o is called an exiting run of a system (C, E) iff it is a run 
of the system, and C(D) = abort. The following theorem includes Theorem 2 as a special 
case. 
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Theorem B.2. For any robot program r and any ground situation term S, there is an 






If Z + Rdo(r, S, S’), then there is a terminating run o of (C, &) such that 
S’ = end(a, S); 
if I + Rexit(r, S, S’), then there is an exiting run o of (C, E) such that S’ = 
end(o, S), where E is the environment determined by I at S. 
If there is a terminating run o of (C, &) such that end(a, S) = S’, then I + S < 
S’ > Rdo(r, S, S’); 
if there is an exiting run o of (C, E) such that end(a. S) = S’, then I + S 6 S’ > 
Rexit(r, S, S’), where & is the environment determined by I at S. 
Proof. We shall construct a recursive function r : P x R -+ A+, where P is the set of 
robot programs, such that for any robot program r, har(r, o) is a robot controller that 
satisfies the two conditions in the theorem with respect to r. We define r inductively on 
the structure of robot programs: 
f (nJ, 0) = y f-;e;;se l 
if c = E 
otherwise, 
a ifa=& 




r(looph, r2), a) 
, 
f(r2, a”) 
= . f(rl, 0’) 
ifforsomen>O,o=ato...oa,oa’oa”suchthat 
r(rt.ai)=stopforl <i<n, andr(q,a’)=abort. 
otherwise, where 0 is a history 
suchthatforsomen>O,a=cqo~~~oo;,oa’, 
f(rl,q)=stopforl<i<n, andthereisno 
proper prefix a” of 0’ such that f (rl , CT”) = stop. 
Clearly, for any program r, ha r (r, a) is a recursive function. We now show that ha r (r, a) 
satisfies the two conditions in Theorem B.2. We do so by induction over the structure of 
programs. 
l r is nil. For any ground situation term S, and any interpretation I: - 
I b (Vs)(Rdo@, S, s) = s = S) A -(Zls)Rexit(niJ, S, s). 
From this, and the definition of f (9, a), the two conditions in the theorem are 
trivially satisfied. 
l r is exit. This case is analogous to the case of nil: For any S, and any I, - 
I + (Vs)(Rexit(&t, S, s) = s = S) A -@s)Rdo(&, S, s). 
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l r is branch(a, r-1, r2). Inductively, we assume that the two conditions are satisfied for 
krT(rl, o) and haZ’(r2, a). Let S be an arbitrary ground situation term, and I an 
arbitrary interpretation. Suppose I b Rdo(branch(a, rl, Q), S, S’). By the definition 
of Rdo, there are two cases: 
(1) 
(2) 
I + SF(a, S) A Rdo(r1, do(u, S), S’). By inductive assumption, there is a termi- 
nating run t of har(r1, a) under the environment determined by I at do(a, S) 
such that S’ = end(t, do(a, S)). By our construction of r(branch(a, rl, r-2), a), 
(u, 1) o t is a terminating run of Aar(brunch(u, rl, r2), a) under the environment 
determined by Z at S. r” Furthermore, 
end((a, 1) o r, S) = end(r, do(a, S)) = S’. 
Z b -SF(a, S) A Rdo(r2, do(a, S), S’). Analogous to the previous case. 
This proves condition (l)(a) of Theorem B.2. The proof of (l)(b) is analogous. 
To prove (2)(a), suppose t is a terminating run of har(brunch(u, ~1, Q), a) under 
the environment I determined by Z at S. Again, there are two cases: 
(1) Z + SF(a, S). By our construction, t = (a, 1) o t’, and r’ is a terminating run 
of ha r(rl , a) under the environment determined by I at do(a, S). By inductive 
assumption, 
Z I= do(u, S) < S’ > Rdo(q, do(a, S), S’), 
where S = end(t’, do(u, S)) = end(t, S). By 
I + Poss(u, S) A SF(u, S) A Rdo(q, do(u, S), S’) > 
Rdo(branch(u, rl, rz), S, S’), 
we have 
I + S < S’ > Rdo(brunch(u, rl, rz), S, S’). 
(2) I b -SF(u) S). Analogous to the previous case. 
This proves (2)(a). The proof of (2)(b) is again analogous. 
l r is loop(r1, t-2). The proof for this case is exactly like that for the branch case, but 
using Lemma B. 1. q 
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3 
We restate Theorem 3: 
Theorem 3. For any TM basic action theory T, any effective controller C, and any ground 
situation term S, there is a robot program r such thatfor any model Z oj‘T and any ground 
situation S’, we have: 
(1) Zf Z b Rdo(r, S, S’), then there is a terminating run o of the system (C, I) such that 
clean(s) = end(a, S), where & is the environment determined by Z at S. 
lo This makes use of easy lemma that if r is a terminating run of C under the environment determined by I at 
&(a, S), and I + SF(a. S), then (a, 1) o r is a terminating run of C’ under the environment determined by I at 
S, where C’ is a controller such that C’(E) = a and C’((a, I) o o) = C(o). 
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(2) If there is a terminating run o of the system (C, E) such that S’ = end(a, S), 
then there is a situation S” such that S’ = clean(S”), and I + S < end(a, S) > 
Rdo(r, S, S”), where & is the environment determined by I at S. 
Proof. The proof involves using the fluents Marked and lot to emulate a Turing machine 
tape. If Murked(n, s) holds, then the nth position of the tape will be 1, and otherwise, 0. To 
indicate the state of some segment of the tape, we will show a sequence of OS and Is, with 
the current location (i.e., lot(s)) taken to be the position of the first digit of the underlined 
pair of OS and 1s. Thus if the initial segment of the tape in SO is @loll, then Zoc(Su) = 1, 
+Iurked(l, So), lMurked(2, So), Murked(3, So), etc. 
We assume without loss of generality that there are only two action A and B. We can 
encode a history as follows: 
OOQl/$ . . .a,&ll, - 
where Ui is 01 or 10 for action A or action B respectively, and where /?i is 01 or 10 for 
outcome 0 or 1 respectively. Since C is a recursive function, there is a Turing machine M 
that computes it. Given a history encoded as above, it will terminate with the tape looking 
like 
where a! is either 0 0 (for abort or I), 11 (for stop) or 0 1 or 10 as above for A or B. Since 
the five special actions have the same power as a Turing machine, there is a robot program 
rM that consists of only Turing actions that senses and marks the tape in exactly this way. 
We can now describe the robot program that achieves the same goal as the controller C. 
l For any fixed string z of OS and Is, let write(z) be the robot program that writes z on 
the tape and sets lot to the position just right of z. It is defined inductively by: 
write(e) = &l; 
write(Oz) = x(eruse, g(right, write(z))); 
write(lz) =&mark, @(right, write(z))). 
l The robot program home is such that whenever the tape encodes some history like: 
OO@lBl.. .%B& 




%(lefi, branch(read_mark, nil exit)))), _1_ 
l The robotprogram ini is [write( 0 0 11) ; home]. ’ ’ 
1 1 For any robot programs r and I’, r ; r’ means executing r followed by Y'. Formally, the “;" notation is defined 
inductively: 
[branch(a, ‘1,~); r] = branch(u, [i-j; r], [r2; r]); 
[loopPI. r2); rl =loop(ri, lr2: rl). 
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. The robot program rA performs the action A, and writes either 0 111 or 10 11 on the 
tape depending on the sensing result returned: 
brunch(A, [w&(1011); home], [write(Olll); home]) 
The program rg is analogous. 




%(right, rB ))h 
g( right, brunch( read-mark, 
g(right, rA 1, 
s&right, loop(nil,nil))))). 
l Finally, the desired robot program r is [ini; loop([rM ; interpret], nil)] where rM is 
the robot program associated with a single step of the effective controller C. 
To paraphrase, the robot program r, starting at some home position on the tape, first writes 
0011 encoding the empty history, and then returns to the home position. Next, within a 
loop, it repeatedly uses rM to place a suitable u at the end of the history, and then interprets 
this (II: if it is 0 0 it goes into an infinite loop; if it is 11 it exits the loop (and so terminates); 
if it is 10, it performs action A, writes either 0 111 or 10 11 on the tape depending on the 
sensing result returned, and then returns to the home position; if it is 0 1, it does the same as 
abovebutforaction B.Note thatwhenczis OlorlO,theeffect of writing 0111or1011 
on the tape depending on the result of action A or B ensures that the tape now encodes an 
extended history 
which is then ready for the next iteration. 
It can be verified that from this construction the conditions in the theorem follow. q 
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